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A JURISPRUDENTIAL ApPROACH TO 
TEACHING LEGAL RESEARCH 
CHARLES J. TEN BRINK * 
Advanced legal research (ALR) courses have become popular 
additions to the landscape of legal education, I typically justified under a 
mandate to teach practical legal skills2 without cramming more into an 
already demanding first-year curriculum. Advocates of ALR curricular 
refinements often propose three primary goals: (1) ensuring that students 
obtain a more profound understanding of the complexities of the research 
tools covered in the first year; (2) introducing students to new tools and 
specialized subject areas, such as tax or international law; and (3) teaching 
students to be informed consumers of research products through 
understanding the underlying principles of research. 
The last of these goals is the most important, because it teaches 
students to become lifelong learners about research tools and processes. 
However, it is also the most often ignored. After all, ALR is the 
quintessential methods course. Law students must leave law school with 
practical research skills. Why would anyone want to confuse the issue by 
sullying it with theory? 
But the dichotomy between the "practical" and the "theoretical" is 
false. Students need both to be effective researchers. Specifically, students 
often lack any appreciation of the structure and organization of legal 
resources because they are rarely exposed to the jurisprudential and 
* 
I. 
2. 
Professor of Law and Director of Library & Technology Services, Michigan State 
University College of Law. The author thanks Dan Barnhizer, Hildur Hanna, and all 
of the reference librarians at the Michigan State University College of Law Library. 
See, e.g., Ann Hemmens, Advanced Legal Research Courses: A Survey of ABA-
Accredited Law Schools, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 209 (2002). 
See generally Robert MacCrate, Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: 
Narrowing the Gap, Legal Education and Professional Development-An 
Educational Continuum, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS B. Since 
the MacCrate Report, law schools have been forced to pay homage to the principle 
that they should produce, in the vocabulary of the law firms that are the primary 
consumers of their educational product, "practice-ready" attorneys. 
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theoretical foundations underlying our conceptions of particular fields of 
doctrine and the research tools we have developed to synthesize and 
systematize those fields. Without such foundational materials, students lack 
a structure in which to achieve the first two goals of ALR. 
Effective teaching of ALR requires an integration of basic 
jurisprudence with the practical "how to" list of research nuts and bolts. 
The theoretical structures underlying legal research are as much a branch of 
jurisprudence as they are of information science. Only by understanding the 
philosophy underlying a research tool-not just how it works, but why it 
works--can students exploit its strengths and work around its weaknesses. 
Critical examination of the power and limitations of the variety of research 
tools available equips students not only to deploy a greater variety of 
sources to the research tasks at hand, but also to become critical judges of 
new sources as they are encountered for the first time. 
Legal research as typically taught focuses upon providing students 
with a toolbox of disconnected skills. The students have not been exposed 
to overarching principles that will guide them in choosing which resources 
to use, and in adapting to a swiftly changing legal research environment. 
Consequently, students tend to view legal research as if it were as simple as 
following a cookbook recipe. They may know how to find a rule in the 
Code of Federal RegUlations, but that means little if they do not understand 
how that rule finds its place in our scheme of law. Upon graduation, 
students at best are proficient at basic legal research using a handful of 
standard legal research tools. At worst, the shift from the closed law school 
environment leaves new attorneys inefficient, ineffective, and confused, 
and their employers frustrated. In either case, new attorneys not only fail to 
"hit the ground running," but also must spend substantial time and costly 
resources learning how to research through trial and error. 
The rapidly changing needs of legal service providers over the last 
two decades have, in tum, imposed substantially new requirements upon 
the pedagogy of legal research. This changing environment has been 
described by many authors, most notably Robert Berring.3 Unfortunately, 
these authors typically conclude that their observations are too recondite to 
form part of a legal research curriculum: 
[I]t is wise to avoid the legal research training question 
completely. This Essay is about legal information. It concerns 
what constitutes legal information, who controls it, and how it is 
changing. Most legal research courses could not possibly 
approach such questions, for lack of time. Furthermore, it is 
unlikely that the instructor has thought through the question. 
3. See, e.g., Robert C. Berring, Legal Information and the Search for Cognitive 
Authority, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1675 (2000). 
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Very few legal scholars have even thought about these issues, 
and if they do, they find it almost impossible to escape the 
constraints of their own experience. The way one learns to 
perform research becomes second nature. It can be put into 
perspective only with the greatest difficulty. Legal research 
training is conducted under chaotic conditions.4 
309 
This essay suggests that the legal research instructor must find the 
time to at least approach these theoretical and foundational issues with 
students. Absent exposure to the "why" behind the "how," students will 
continue to approach legal research as automata, trained to press particular 
buttons in a particular order without any understanding of the reasons why 
this often produces suboptimal research. The author's experience in 
teaching advanced legal research has shown that students are capable of 
absorbing theoretical concepts and applying them to the practical task of 
legal research. This results in a substantial improvement in their work, and 
these students are much better equipped to adapt to a changing research 
. 5 
enVIronment. 
I. STRUCTURING JURISPRUDENCE DISCUSSIONS IN ALR CLASSES 
A. Philosophies of Communication 
It is best to admit at the outset that the discussion of jurisprudence in a 
single lecture launching a class in advanced legal research will be neither 
complete nor nuanced. Nonetheless, some basic introduction to the relevant 
principles is possible. The goal is that students consider how structures of 
legal thought affect structures of information, with a particular focus on the 
contrast between late nineteenth century formalism and early twentieth 
century realism.6 The class opens with an excursion into research as part of 
the process of communication, and the effect of differing purposes of 
communication on the way we carry out a research plan. 
It is the premise of the ALR course that research is a fundamental part 
of the process of communication. That seems ludicrous to most students. 
For most of them, research is just about the most solitary activity 
imaginable, and conjures up a picture of rows of monastic carrels with 
silently brooding scholars. Students normally think of written and oral 
4. Id. at 1677-78. 
5. This is indeed that most despised of fonnats, the "how-I-do-it-good" article. With the 
full recognition that a single teacher's experience with a limited number of students is 
anecdote rather than data, that experience may provide a useful point of departure for 
others to consider changes in the way legal research is taught. 
6. This is about half of the theory covered in our course. The remainder deals with 
concepts from infonnation science; this will fonn the subject of another essay. 
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advocacy as the communicative aspects of legal work, and an important 
first step in opening up their minds is asking them to think about why 
research is the third leg of that stool. 
It is a commonplace of legal writing courses that legal advocacy is 
essentially storytelling, the lesson being that the audience must be given a 
coherent and compelling story if you wish to persuade that audience to do 
what you want. When you plunge into a research project, in order to decide 
what to research, you must already have formulated some idea of what that 
story will be. Most of us do not recognize this, or it so quickly becomes 
intuitive that we do not think about it. But the types of information we 
search for will limit and establish a form for the answer that emerges. You 
cannot begin a research project without having some preconceived notion 
of the story you want to tell-that is the obvious part. What is less obvious 
is that the process of your research will change that story, and this is where 
students so often go wrong. Maybe it should change that story, and just 
maybe you do not want it to. Either way, you have lost control of your own 
work if you do not realize that that is what is happening. But it is critical 
that you recognize the tendency of the story to run away with itself and 
plan carefully how you want to communicate with your audience. At the 
same time, you must recognize that no matter how well you plan, you will 
sometimes be led down the wrong road. That is all right. Sometimes you 
learn a lot by trying to tell the wrong story, or telling your story the wrong 
way. But again, self-awareness is what really matters. Students must 
internalize the element of storytelling before they can achieve a balanced 
view of the process of research. 
If research is a part of the process of communication, students must 
consider the nature of legal communication. Aristotle characterized three 
elements as comprising communication-the speaker, the speech, and the 
audience7-and asserted that the audience is the ultimate reason for 
communication. I elicit from students the variety of audiences they face in 
the process of legal communication,8 and a roughly corresponding variety 
of styles of communication.9 The next step is to convey to the students that 
the audience, and the way in which we address it, presupposes important 
choices about the information we wish to convey-in other words, that we 
have already selected some form of plot or story line even before we begin 
the process of legal research. 
7. See ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 16 (Lane Cooper trans., D. Appleton-Century Co. 1932). 
8. E.g., courts, judges, juries, other attorneys (colleagues or opponents), clients, 
legislators, lobbyists, scholars, administrators, and the general public. 
9. E.g., persuade, negotiate, counsel, advise, command, demand, explain, educate, or 
intimidate. 
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B. Bridging the Gap Between Philosophy and Jurisprudence-
Fonnalism, Realism, and Communication Through Research 
Tools 
311 
While ALR students must grasp the relationship between 
jurisprudence and their research tools, it is neither possible nor desirable in 
such a class to provide more than a basic introduction to fundamental 
jurisprudential concepts. The point is not to engage in extended exegeses of 
H.L.A. Hart, John Rawls, or Critical Legal Studies. Rather, the primary 
focus of research-related introductions to jurisprudence must be upon 
schools of thought that gave form to the basic tools of legal research. 
The most basic tools of legal research today are the progeny, whether 
in electronic or print fonn, of the tools developed at the beginning of the 
twentieth century to cope with the explosion of published cases and an 
expanding regime of statutory and regulatory law: citators, looseleafs, and 
comprehensive digesting. Thus the jurisprudence component of ALR most 
effectively begins with the concept of formalism and the distinction 
between the fonnalist school of the late nineteenth century and the realists 
of the early twentieth century. Students unfamiliar with the basic 
vocabulary of jurisprudence nonetheless experience a shock of 
recognition-like the man who was pleased to discover that he had been 
speaking prose all his life-when they recognize the formalist and realist 
arguments that have long formed an intuitive part of their law school 
discourse and their own philosophical bent. This has the effect of 
integrating legal research into the patterns of discourse they have 
developed in their other courses, making it part of their understanding of 
the development of the narrative structures oflaw. 
Having started students thinking about the concept of communication, 
they are ready to consider how the worldview of the speaker and the 
audience may distort that process. Given the close relationship between 
classical fonnalism and the basic research tools common to the vast 
majority oflegal research-digests and annotated statutory compilations-I 
begin the actual jurisprudential inquiry with two readings incorporating the 
basic tenets of formalism: the introduction to Langdell's contracts 
casebooklo and a description of Langdell's concept of the scientific method 
from a forthcoming work by David Barnhizer. II 
Any number of readings could convey Langdell's attempts to make 
the law a learned profession and divorce it from practice, but Barnhizer 
10. See CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS v-vii (Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1871). 
11. See David Barnhizer, Truth or Consequences? The Impact of Political Movements on 
Intellectuals' Freedom and Honesty (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author). 
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does a particularly good job of criticizing what he characterizes as 
Langdellian scientism: "[t]he belief that the assumptions, methods of 
research, etc., of the physical and biological sciences are equally 
appropriate and essential to all other disciplines, including the humanities 
and the social sciences.,,12 The apparatus of scientific investigation was 
thereby applied to a chaos of judicial decision-making-note the premise 
that only appellate court decisions were the "real" source of law-and the 
modem study of law was born. 
I summarize the basic principles underlying the scientistic/classical 
formalist view of the law as follows: 13 
• Rules are knowable. 
• Rules can be perfectly communicated; once stated, everyone 
shares in the same understanding of the rule. 
• Rules can be discovered by the right application of reason. 
• Rules are capable of filling space, that is, of deciding all 
propositions capable of being formulated. 
Of course this is an extremely simplistic-perhaps pejorative-view 
of formalist philosophy, but the purpose is to make its shortcomings 
obvious to students. It thereby throws a harsh and unforgiving light on the 
corresponding deficiencies of that monument to nineteenth century 
formalism-John West's digest topic and key number system. 
West's indexing scheme is closely related to the Linnaean system of 
taxonomy, and I illustrate this by showing students the classification of the 
various species of bearl4-any species would do, but it makes a nice 
contrast to the bulls introduced later in the lecture. Such a lineage, set forth 
in outline form, bears a startling resemblance to the outline of a legal topic 
in the digests. The problem with the Linnaean system is that it has become 
a substitute for reality, rather than a useful but imperfect model for 
describing the natural world. IS It is a simple but illuminating jump to make 
this same point for West's digests. 16 What was intended as a useful and 
descriptive indexing system has become an end in itself. Researchers tacitly 
believe that there are exactly 414 legal topics, each with its own detailed 
outline, and that in some way this mirrors the reality of the law. 
12. ld. (manuscript at 164). 
13. See, for example, Hart's discussion of the open-textured nature of law in H.L.A. 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 132 (1961). 
14. See generally Sten Lindroth, The Two Faces of Linnaeus, in LfNNAEUS: THE MAN AND 
HIS WORK I, 1-62 (Tore Frangsmyr ed., 1983). 
15. See, e.g., STEPHEN JAY GOULD, WONDERFUL LIFE: THE BURGESS SHALE AND THE 
NATURE Of HISTORY 98-100 (1989). 
16. See, e.g., F. Allan Hanson, From Key Numbers to Keywords: How Automation Has 
Transformed the Law, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 563, 599 (2002). 
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Such a stern devotion to logic naturally calls for its counterpoint. 
Students learn about the reaction of the early twentieth century realists with 
Karl Llewellyn's Some Realism About Realism,17 and draw the obvious 
contrasts with the formalist view: 
• Rules are mutable. 
• Law is a means to a social, political, or economic end. 
o Rules are just predictions of behavior. 18 
o Rules do not rule, policy rules. 
• The communication of a rule is inherently ambiguous. 
• Rules can be arbitrary. 
• Rules do not fill space. 
Most students recognize legal realism as their familiar law school 
world, in which they are taught not only to ask what the rule is, but why it 
is, and what purpose it serves. In particular, students have been taught to 
dwell on the point that legal arguments do not exist in a vacuum, but are 
always interacting with their time and place. At this point, the students 
begin to see why the process of legal research they learned in their first 
year of law school felt so out of touch with their substantive course work. It 
relies on a different analytical paradigm, one in which the law is a scientific 
enterprise independent of social, political, and economic forces. By making 
that distinction explicit, they are freed from an attempt to reconcile those 
paradigms, and can more easily manipulate them to the end of perfecting 
their skills at finding and communicating information. 
Just for fun, and because it seems ludicrous to stop at mid-century, I 
also present a short version of Wittgensteinian rule skepticism and the 
Critical Legal Studies movement: 
• Rules do not exist. 
• Communication is impossible. 
• Rules "legitimize a social order that most people find 
alienating and inhumane,,19-much like law school. 
At this point, a reference to Lewis Carroll helps to fix the concept of 
uncertainty in the minds of the students. '''When 1 use a word,' Humpty 
Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to 
mean-neither more nor less .... The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 
'which is to be master-that's all. ",20 It takes a substantial leavening of 
11. 44HARV.L.REv. 1222, 1233-42(1931). 
18. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 451, 461 (1891). "The 
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I 
mean by the law." Jd. 
19. Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal 
Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369, 310 (1982). 
20. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 94 (Random House 1946). 
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humor to help students see the virtue of learning the rudiments of legal 
philosophy in the first hours of a research methods course.21 
As noted above, this exercise not only helps the students to 
understand how legal paradigms differ, but also to develop a vocabulary for 
dealing with that difference. The goal is to instill an abiding skepticism 
toward the materials of legal research. If this seems overwrought, consider 
what we are up against-for most students, West's digest topic and key 
number system feels something like the monolith in 2001: A Space 
21. With a strong belief in humor as a mnemonic device, I present students with the 
following summary of these three philosophies. My thanks to the author, Daniel 
Bamhizer, Associate Professor, Michigan State University College of Law. 
Formalism 
You have two cows. You execute a contract with your neighbor to sell 
her one of the cows, which cow is identified by the presence of black 
and white coloring, and an ear tag with the number 732 imprinted on it. 
You deliver the cow, and your neighbor refuses to pay. The court holds 
that under principles of scientifically discoverable contract law (which 
are clear, unambiguous, and apply in every case), there is no possible 
ambiguity in the contract, and the law is absolutely clear and knowable 
with respect to the obligations of the parties. Judgment in your favor, 
costs to be charged against the defendant. The court is absolutely 
correct, and will be so in every case. 
Realism 
You have two cows. You execute a contract with your neighbor to sell 
her one of the cows, which cow is identified by the presence of black 
and white coloring, and an ear tag with the number 732 imprinted on it. 
You deliver the cow, and your neighbor refuses to pay. The court 
recognizes that there will always be conflicting rules that can govern in 
any case, and therefore courts must have discretion to choose between 
those conflicting rules and principles to achieve societal policy goals. 
The court weighs the rule in favor of enforcing contracts according to 
their terms against your neighbor'S claim that the contract was 
unconscionable. Guided by the policy in favor of contract enforcement, 
the court holds in your favor. Judgment in your favor, costs to be 
charged against the defendant. The court, on average, consistently 
applies the law to achieve societal policies. 
CLS 
You have two cows. Ownership of cows is an arbitrary rule, constructed 
by those in power to maintain their position of power and oppress those 
out of power. It does not really matter whether you go to court or not 
because rules are arbitrary, and cannot be consistently applied in every 
case. Judgment does not matter anyway because we cannot really know 
what the judge meant by the judgment. You deconstruct the cows and 
eat them. 
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Odyssey. In the absence of a connection with its historical moment and 
underlying reasons for being, it seems so vast, complex, and arcane as to be 
one with the forces of nature. 
At this point, having tom the idol of certainty from the students' 
hearts, it is time to give them some hope. The goal of the class is to 
produce healthy skeptics, not angry legal Bolsheviks. Having been exposed 
to the world of Wittgenstein and Humpty, it is best that they not be left 
there. A short reading from H.L.A. Hart is the tonic?2 Philosophers may 
argue whether Hart's neo-formalism truly reconciles Langdell and 
Wittgenstein, but he furnishes amply large shoulders to support a law 
student. While accepting the inevitability of ambiguity and asserting the 
open texture of law, Hart leads the student back through the looking glass 
into a world in which most people do share a core of meaning and where 
communication is possible. Although hardly a ringing endorsement, Hart 
offers students the comfort that "the head-note is usually correct enough.,,23 
II. INTEGRATING JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL AUDIENCE 
At this point I ask the students to return to the question of audience, 
picturing themselves in front of a judge, perhaps the most difficult audience 
they will ever face. How do they convince this person that their clients 
should win? I ask them to consider what style of argument; and what 
corresponding legal research, would appeal to different judges with the 
different worldviews we have discussed. Do they know enough about 
judges to know what would be attractive? Do all judges have enough in 
common? 
Students generally conclude that most judges "feel" the value behind 
at least a fayade of determinable legal rules, and find such arguments 
appealing, which is why the whole digest-topic-and-key-number business 
was not discarded decades ago. But judges are also smart enough to know 
that the law is open-textured, and furnishes them with alternative 
possibilities. In other words, a purely formalist argument may be a good 
foundation, but it is a loser if it does not give the judge a hook on which to 
hang a happy ending to the story you are trying to tell. Overwhelmingly, 
that means using a legal realist style of argument to show that not only is 
the answer you seek the "right" answer under the rules, it also makes good 
sense socially, economically, and politically. The script is a simple one: "if 
you decide for my client, you will be upholding all that is good and just and 
true and beautiful. Oh, and by the way, you will be upheld on appeal, and 
here are all the cases that say so." A perfectly airtight formalist argument 
22. I assign Chapter VII, "Fonnalism and Rule-Scepticism," from The Concept of Law. 
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-32 (1961). 
23. Id. at 131. 
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will not prevail if it means the judge has to evict the widows and orphans 
on Christmas Eve. 
The class closes with a return to Karl Llewellyn, who, having 
ridiculed predictability so thoroughly in the 1930s, had to resort to a new 
coinage when his views grew more Hartian late in life: 
For the fact is that the work of our appellate courts all over the 
country is reckonable. It is reckonable first, and on a relative 
scale, far beyond what any sane man has any business expecting 
from a machinery devoted to settling disputes self-selected for 
their toughness. It is reckonable second, and on an absolute 
scale, quite sufficiently for skilled craftsmen to make usable and 
valuable judgments about likelihoods, and quite sufficiently to 
render the handling of an a~peal a fitting subject for effective 
and satisfying craftsmanship. 
It is on that core of shared understanding-the concept of 
reckonability-that the process of legal research depends. 
How does all this affect the students who are exposed to it? First, it 
impresses upon them the understanding that legal research is not an 
endeavor distinct from the process of legal reasoning and argument. They 
understand why research can not proceed without an initial theory of the 
case, and how that theory and the information they uncover will playoff 
against each other as their knowledge of the law grows. 
Second, by understanding the value of process, they are less frustrated 
with the time it takes to achieve "the answer." Recognition of the 
disconnect between the arguments they wish to make and the structures of 
traditional legal research materials allows students to use those tools more 
effectively because they are no longer being asked to perform tasks for 
which they were not designed. 
Finally, it teaches a healthy skepticism. While the West digest system 
is an incredibly powerful research tool, once students recognize that it has 
its limitations, they are much more likely to be able to ask the same 
questions about other reference sources. Making them critical consumers of 
legal information is the most important thing we can do in equipping them 
for careers that will span several decades and almost certainly see changes 
in the delivery mechanisms for legal information at least as startling as the 
advent of Lexis, Westlaw, and the World Wide Web for the preceding 
generation of attorneys. 
24. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING ApPEALS 4 (1960). 
